We discuss a binary nature of funding impacts. Under some conditions, funding is either cost or benefit, i.e., one of the lending/borrowing rates does not play any role in pricing derivatives. When we price derivatives, considering different lending/borrowing rates leads to semi-linear BSDEs and PDEs, so we need to solve the equations numerically. However, once we can guarantee that only one of the rates affects pricing, we can recover linear equations and derive analytic formulae. Moreover, as a byproduct, our results explain how debt value adjustment (DVA) and funding benefits are different. It is often believed that DVA and funding benefits are overlapped but it will be shown that the two components are affected by different mathematical structures of derivative transactions. We will see later that FBA occurs where the payoff is non-increasing, but this relationship becomes weaken as the funding choices of underlying assets are transferred to repo markets.
 Introduction
The financial crisis in - has forced us to examine many parts of general practice to price derivatives. In the crisis, the defaults of big firms heightened default risk. Moreover, banks became more reluctant to lend money and, as a result, the gap between London inter-bank offered rate (LI-BOR) and overnight indexed swap (OIS) rate was widened. By the changed market conditions, banks began to make several adjustments in derivative prices. It has long been a standard to make credit value adjustment (CVA). CVA is correcting derivative prices for the risk of counterparty's default. On the other hand, debt value adjustment (DVA) is a deduction for the hedger's own default. If one party defaults earlier than the contractual maturity, a promised payment should be settled as close-out amount. However, because of the default, the obligation may not fully honored. For the risk, it is general that collateral is pledged. Funding value adjustment (FVA) is the adjustment of derivative prices for the excessive cost and benefit in maintaining the hedging portfolio and posting collateral.
Considering entity-specific information in derivative prices has required many changes in classical pricing theory. First, since law of one price does not hold, when a price is given for a contract, it may be an arbitrage opportunity for a trader, but may not be for others. For the issue, entity-specific definitions of arbitrage opportunity and fair values were suggested by Bichuch et al. () ; Bielecki et al. () ; Bielecki & Rutkowski () and those arguments were applied to various derivatives (Kim et al., a,b, for example) . In addition, many other pricing methodologies have been developed. A replication pricing under FVA with collateral was introduced by Piterbarg (). Li & Wu () ; Wu () also discussed replication pricing with CVA, FVA with collateral. For risk-neutral valuation principle, readers can refer to Brigo et al. () . Crépey (a,b) discussed min-variance pricing under default risks, funding spreads, and collateral.
Still, there have remained many puzzles among the adjustments. Especially, DVA and FVA have their own but intertwined issues. First, there is a doubt on reporting DVA, which is to say that an aggravation of own default risk can be beneficial to the shareholders. As we will see later, theoretically, the increase of own default risk can be monetized by buying back their bonds. However, it is often impossible in practice because the bank should really default to realize the benefit. Indeed, DVA is accepted by both IFRS and GAAP, but excluded from common equity tier  capital (CET), which is a proxy of shareholder's wealth. Second, it is often believed that DVA double-counts funding benefits (see Remark .). FVA has two parts: funding benefit adjustment (FBA) and funding cost adjustment (FCA) . Both DVA and FBA may originate from banks' own default risk. DVA is a deduction from liabilities of a bank due to its creditworthiness. On the other hand, FBA, as a counterpart of FCA, may countervail FCA which is also from the bank's own default risk. Thus, including both DVA and FBA may inflate the bank's reported profit (see Cameron, ) as well as deflate the price charged to counterparties. Possibly due to these reasons, seller's DVA is often excluded in derivative transactions.
FVA is more arguable. According to Modigliani-Miller (MM) theorem, which is a long-established financial principle, choices of funding should not be considered in pricing. On the other hand, in practice, with the increased interest rates offered by funding desks, it will be loss to the traders without recouping the funding costs from counterparties. Indeed, traders feel confident that funding costs are observable in derivative transactions (see Andersen et al., ) ). If the traders' belief is true, the inclusion of FVA in derivative prices may be justified by market frictions, which is a viola-
where T is the maturity of the bilateral contract. Let W = (W 1 , . . . , W n ) be a standard n-dimensional Brownian motion under Q. Let F = (F t ) t≥0 be the usual natural filtration of (W t ) t≥0 . Then we define
We call F (resp. G) the reference filtration (resp. full filtration). Then we consider a filtered probability space (Ω, G, G, Q). Note that τ i , i ∈ {H, C}, are G-stopping times but may not be F-stopping times. As a convention, for any G-progressively measurable process u, (G, Q)-semimartingale U , and s ≤ t, where the integral is well-defined. In addition, for any G-stopping time θ and process (ξ t ) t≥0 , we denote ξ θ · ≔ ξ ·∧θ , and when ξ θ− exists, ∆ξ θ ≔ ξ θ −ξ θ− . In what follows, for i ∈ {H, C}, t ≥ 0, we denote G i t ≔ Q(τ i > t|F t ), and
G t ≔ Q(τ > t|F t ).
The following assumption stands throughout this paper. The next lemma is borrowed from Bielecki et al. () and Chapter  in Bielecki & Rutkowski () .
Lemma .. Let i ∈ {H, C}. We define spaces of random variables, and stochastic processes as follows.
(i) Let
Definition .. Let m ∈ N and p ≥ 2.
• L p T : the set of all F T -measurable random variables ξ, such that
• S p T : the set of all real valued, F-adapted, càdlàg  processes (U t ) t≥0 , such that
• H p,m T : the set of all R m -valued, F-predictable processes (U t ) t≥0 , such that
• H 
We consider a hedger and counterparty entering a "new" contract which exchanges promised dividends. First, we proceed our argument with the assumption that the two parties have not made any contract before the new contract. Later, this assumption will be relaxed by slightly modifying our model so that incremental effects can be considered.  Right continuous and left limit  Let D N t denote the accumulated amount of the promised dividends up to t ≥ 0. We assume that D N is an F-adapted càdàg process, and the value is determined by an n-dimensional underlying asset process S = (S 1 , . . . , S n ) that follows the next stochastic differential equation (SDE):
for some F-progressively measurable processes r and (σ i ) ⊤ ∈ R n . In addition, we assume that the F-adapted process D N is independent of the information of defaults.
Remark .. Note that an F-adapted process may depend on default risks, since the default intensities are F-adapted.
If a default occurs before the maturity of the contract T , two parties stop exchanging D N , and the derivative contract is marked-to-market. The method to calculate the close-out amount is determined before initiation of the contract and documented in Credit Support Annex (CSA)  . Let e N t denote the close-out amount at t ≤ T . In this paper, we deal with two conventions for the close-out amount e N : clean close-out and replacement close-out. We postpone explaining the conventions to the next section after we define the hedger's hedging portfolio. As conventions, dD N t ≥ 0, e N t ≥ 0 (resp. < 0) means that the hedger pays to (resp. is paid by) the counterparty at t ≤ T .
Example .. If the hedger buys a zero coupon bond of unit notional amount,
The obligation to settle e N may not be fully honored because of the default. To mitigate the risk, the two parties post or receive collateral (often referred to as margin). The amount of the collateral posted at t ≥ 0 (only for the new contract) is denoted by m N t . We assume that (m N t ) t≥0 is an F-adapted process. By Assumption ., τ i , i ∈ {H, C}, are totally inaccessible, which means that the defaults arrive with surprise. Margins are posted because we do not know full information of the defaults, and this is why m N is calculated on the observable information F. The exact forms of m N will be given later after the conventions for e N are introduced. We assume that the close-out payment is settled at the moment of default without delay and m N is posted continuously. As conventions, if m N t ≥ 0 (resp. < 0), it means that the hedger posts (receives) the collateral at t ≤ T .
Remark .. In practice, there exists a gap between the day of default and actual settlement. The delay is required to check whether the default really happened, collect information of the contract, find the best candidate to replace the defaulting party (Murphy, ) . Gap risk is the risk from the gap between the close-out amount at the day of settlement and the last day that variation margin is posted. For gap risk, two parties post initial margin which is often calculated by a risk measure. Note that we ignore the gap risk and initial margin. If we consider initial margin, we encounter anticipative backward stochastic differential equations (ABSDEs) under replacement close-out. For the main result of this paper, Malliavin calculus for BSDEs will be used. However, to the best of our knowledge, Malliavin differentiability of ABSDEs has not been studied. Moreover, It is a challenging problem to solve ABSDEs numerically (see Agarwal et al., ) . The continuous posting of variation margin can also be seen as a simplification. One may want to model m as a càdlàg step process. For the discussion, readers may want to refer to Brigo, Liu, et al. () .
 A part of ISDA master agreement  At default, collateral is not exchanged. Thus, we set the collateral amount posted at τ ≤ T , as m N τ− . Therefore, the cash-flow at default can be
However, it is immaterial whether we separate ∆D N τ from e N or not in the modeling, because jumps of F-adapted càdlàg processes are exhausted by F-stopping times (see He & Yan, , Theorem .). Thus, by (.),
Let C N denote the accumulated cash-flows. Then, for any t ≤ T a.s,
is the loss rate of the hedger (resp. counterparty). Recall that C N is derived from the assumption that the new contract is the first contract between the hedger and counterparty. Now, we relax the assumption so that we can consider incremental cash-flows.
.. Incremental Cash-flows
Assume that the two parties has made contracts given by some endowed càdlàg F-adapted processes (D E , e E , m E ) before initiation of the new contract. If the two parties did not enter the contract, for the bank of the hedger, the cash-flows would be
On the other hand, when entering the new contract, the exposure and margin would be e E + e N and m E + m N , respectively. In this case, the summed cash-flows for the bank are
Thus, the amount that should be handled by the hedger to enter the "new" contract can be given by
We denote the cash-flow process after τ by Θ, i.e.,
We assume that the hedger can access to (defaultable) zero coupon bonds of hedger and counterparty. Let S H (resp. S C ) denote the defaultable bond of the hedger (resp. counterparty), where S H and S C follow the next SDE:
where (σ i ) ⊤ ∈ R n are F-progressively measurable processes. S 1 , . . . , S n are used to hedge D N , while S H and S C are used to hedge Θ. We define the (n + 2) × n matrix σ as
Note that the considered financial markets are complete, since there are n + 2 sources of randomness, W , τ H , τ C , and n + 2 traded assets S, S H , S C . 
We call the (n + 2)-dimensional G-predictable process ϕ the hedger's hedging strategy.
Remark .. ϕ is chosen to be G-adapted only to describe an immediate action taken at default. We shall see later that on [0, τ), ϕ is F-adapted.
If the collateral is pledged, the posting party is remunerated by the receiving party according to a certain interest rate. When m N t ≥ 0 (resp. < 0), the counterparty (resp. hedger) pays the interest rate R m,ℓ t (resp. R m,b t ) at t ≤ T . We assume that the collateral is posted as cash and the interest rate is accrued to a margin account of the hedger. We denote the lending and borrowing accounts B m,ℓ and B m,b respectively, i.e., B m,i , i ∈ {ℓ, b}, are given by 
We assume that the variation margin m can be rehypothecated, i.e., m N is used by the hedger to maintain her portfolio.
Remark .. The margin account for m E may be dealt with by other dealers, so it is not a part of the hedging portfolio.
Some underlying assets can be traded through repo markets. We denote the set of indices for which a repo market is available by ρ ⊆ I ≔ {1, 2, . . . , n, H, C}. We assume that the borrowing and lending repo market rates are the same, and for i ∈ ρ, let R ρ,i denote the repo rate. Moreover, for any i ∈ ρ, let B ρ,i denote the account that R ρ,i accrues, i.e., B ρ,i follows dB
(.)
For i ∈ ρ, we denote the number of units of B ρ,i by η ρ,i . Then it follows that for any i ∈ ρ,
If the hedger has any surplus cash, she can earn the lending rate R ℓ , while for borrowing money, she needs to pay the borrowing rate R b . For i ∈ {ℓ, b}, let B i denote the hedger's funding account and η i denote the number of units of B i . Therefore, it follows that
. Hedger's Incremental Hedging Portfolio
Now, we are almost ready to define dealer's incremental portfolio. Another ingredient in defining hedging portfolios is incremental funding effects. These effects will be considered by imposing some conditions on the hedging portfolio. The detail will be followed after the next definition.
for any t ∈ R + , then V is called the hedger's incremental hedging portfolio.

Remark .. Note that by (.), C t = C t∧τ , ∀t ≥ 0, and by (.), V t = V t∧τ , ∀t ≥ 0.
Our goal is to find a proper price charged to the counterparty and hedging strategy ϕ satisfying Definition . and a certain terminal condition. We seek to impose the terminal condition so that an incremental funding effect should be considered. The incremental funding effect means the difference between the funding cost/benefit of two choices: entering or not entering the new contract. To explain the necessity of the incremental effect briefly, consider a situation that the dealer wants to enter a new contract that makes the hedging portfolio fall in borrowing state. If there have been no business of the bank before the contract, the treasury department would finance the dealer with the borrowing rate, and the excessive borrowing cost might be charged to the counterparty. However, if the bank's initial position was in lending state before the contract, the treasury department should consider deduction of lending profit rather than excessive borrowing cost. The mentioned activity can be seen that the dealer borrows and keeps the bank's initial portfolio for funding the portfolio, and returns it to treasury at maturity.
To explain the mathematical detail, let B ǫ denote the endowed bank's portfolio without entering the new contract, for some ǫ ∈ R such that B ǫ 0 = ǫ. We sometimes call B ǫ legacy portfolio. In reality, B ǫ is a massive combination of numerous portfolios. We assume that the legacy portfolio is approximately risk-neutral and grows with respect to their funding rates. Therefore,
and we denote s ǫ ≔ R ǫ − r. Now, let us think of V as the bank's summed profit/loss and consider two cases. First, if the dealer does not enter the contract exchanging C, the bank will have B ǭ τ atτ. Second, the dealer can enter the contract with a certain initial price, say p ∈ R, for the contract from the counterparty. Then, the bank's initial wealth is ǫ + p, namely
The dealer gains from investing in risky assets and accounts. These revenues are used to pay the cash-flows C. Thus, in (.), represents the hedging error between the investment and cash-flows. Recall that we consider complete markets (there are n + 2 sources of randomness, (W , τ H , τ C ), and n + 2 hedging assets π). Therefore, we can expect that we can find a hedging strategy that replicates the cash-flows with null hedging error up to termination of the contract, either by the maturity or default. For example, if ǫ = 0, we can expect to find (V , π) such that Vτ = 0. However, since the opportunity cost for the bank is the profit/loss from legacy portfolio, the portfolio value atτ should be compared with B ǭ τ , i.e., we seek to find (V , π) such that
and the dealer may want to charge
 to the counterparty. Therefore, by (.) together with (.), (.), (.), (.), (.), (.), (.), (.), we need to solve the following BSDE:
(.)
For now, we do not examine the existence and uniqueness of (.). The solvability will be examined by a reduced form of (.). The financial interpretation of each component in (.) will be provided later in the following section. Before the detail, we first discuss the incremental funding impacts by a simple example.
T . We ignore default risks and set π H = π C = m N = 0. In this case, (V , π 1 ) is given by
To consider a net profit/loss to the hedger without the legacy portfolio, consider
and we denote thatπ
Assuming there exists a unique solution (v,π 1 ) ∈ S 2 T × H 2 T of (.), for any t ≥ 0, we define
FBA ∆ (resp. FCA ∆ ) represents the incremental funding benefits (resp. costs) for entering the new contract. Notice that as ǫ increases, v +B ǫ − π 1 is more likely to positive. Consider a case that v − π 1 is negative but v +B ǫ − π 1 is non-negative. If we ignore the incremental effect, i.e., ǫ = 0, the dealer should consider the increased funding cost. However, in the view of incremental effects, instead, the deduction of funding benefit should be included in the derivative price. However, the dealer also need to consider the opportunity cost for not entering the new contract, e.g., if ǫ ≥ 0, the lost (discounted) benefit at t ≤ T would bẽ

The difference between the two impacts is the actual net benefit and cost, FBA ∆ and ∆FCA ∆ , that should be charged to the counterparty. Indeed, by (.), (.) and (.), the dealer would want to charge
Thus, under linear funding models, v does not depend on B ǫ .
In what follows, for simplicity, we impose some realistic assumptions on interest rates, and the endowed processes, e E and m E . In practice, R m,i , i ∈ {ℓ, b}, are chosen as Federal funds or EONIA rates, approximately r. In addition, the difference between OIS and repo market rates can be interpreted as the liquidity premium of the repo markets. We assume the repo markets are liquid enough for the difference to be small. Moreover, we assume that OIS rate, (r t ) t≥0 , is the smallest among all interest rates. In addition, e E and m E are given before the new contract, so they are chosen exogenously, i.e., they do not depend on V . These assumptions are summarized as follows.
(ii) R ℓ ≥ r and R b ≥ r.
(iii) e E and m E are exogenous processes.
Remark .. The assumption on repo market rates given in Assumption .-(i) is merely for simplicity in representing (.). Mathematically, it does not play any crucial role.
Recall that we have not yet specified the amount of close-out e N in C. In the next section, two important close-out conventions are introduced: clean price and replacement cost. Clean price is basically the risk-neutral price of D N . By using the SDE that the clean price follows, we can remove D N from C. After the elimination of D N , the rest of cash-flows is Θ which is exchanged only at one point τ. Thus, by subtracting the clean price from V , we can recover a standard BSDE with (G, Q)-martingales, W and M i , i ∈ {H, C}. Then we further reduce the BSDE to a BSDE only with the Brownian motions by the typical argument of filtration reduction.
.. Close-out Conventions
When the contract terminates earlier than the contractual maturity by one party's default, the defaulting party should settle the close-out amount. The close-out amount is calculated by a determining party which will act in good faith (ISDA, ). As stated in ISDA (, p.), "the Determining Party may consider any relevant information, including, without limitation, one or more of the following types of information: quotations (either firm or indicative) for replacement transactions supplied by one or more third parties that may take into account the creditworthiness of the Determining Party at the time the quotation is provided and the terms of any relevant documentation . . . ".

The statement leaves some rooms for interpretation. ISDA recommends to consider creditworthiness of the surviving party, but it is not mandatory. Moreover, it is unclear whether funding costs should be considered in the replacement transaction. Therefore, we consider two close-out conventions: clean price and replacement cost. Clean price is the risk-neutral price without XVA. The close-out with clean price is often called clean close-out and risk-free close-out. Let p N denote the clean price, i.e.,
Clean close-out (or risk-free close-out) has been often chosen in literature (for example, Crépey (a,b)).
Remark .. Bichuch et al. () also considered expected value of discounted cash-flow in absence of default risk, but in the calculation, they assumed flexibility to choose the discounting rate and probability measure. Indeed, they chose the pricing measure as an equivalent probability measure such that (B i ) −1 S, i ∈ {ℓ, b}, are martingales. In other words, the amount is "clean price+FVA". This choice is for avoiding mismatch of pricing measures to obtain a closed-form solution. We will explain this point later with examples.
Replacement cost (or replacement close-out) means the price under XVA. In this case, it is not clear which funding rate should be chosen. We assume that the replacing party has similar credit spreads to the hedger. Recall that V − B ǫ is the value for calculating the derivative price in view of the hedger. In other words, one may want to choose the value of V − B ǫ at the default for the replacement cost. However, at the default, there is a jump in V by π i , i ∈ {H, C}. Moreover, π i is retained in V for the default risk, i.e., the close-out payment. Therefore, if we take
the defaulting party would pay the remainder after the deduction of the same amount, basically nothing. Hence, for replacement close-out, we should set
In both conventions, we assume that the collateral is a portion of the close-out amount. More precisely, for 0 ≤ L m ≤ 1 (margin loss),
Note that (.) is consistent with our financial modeling. Indeed, if there is a G-adapted process satisfying (.), in our filtration setup G, there is an F-adapted process V F such that
Therefore, under replacement close-out, the margin process
In what follows, we assume that the endowed margin also follows the same convention as (.), i.e.,
The two close-out conventions have pros and cons in financial modeling. Clean price may be disadvantageous to the defaulting party because the default risk of surviving party is not considered. However, the surviving party's default risk can be negatively affected by the default, especially when defaulting party has a systemic impact. In that case, replacement closeout may heavily penalize the surviving party. Readers can refer to Brigo & Morini () for the comparison.
(ii) A similar collateral convention was discussed by Burgard & Kjaer () . For BSDEs approach on general endogenous collateral, readers can refer to Nie & Rutkowski () .
Before further argument, we provide a lemma on properties of clean price p N . The following lemma will be used to present an XVA process and simplify the representation of the amount of cash-flow at default Θ. Readers may want to recall (.), the definition of p N , before the following lemma.
(iii) dp
Proof. (i) is from the definition and (ii) is a directly obtained from (i). For (iii), notice that
Thus, by (local) martingale representation property, there exists Z N ∈ H 2,n T ,loc such that for any t,
Therefore, p N t follows the SDE: dp
Note that Z N is the (discounted) delta risk of clean price. For example, consider n = 1 and a stock forward contract with exercise price K, and assume r, σ 1 are deterministic. Then
Recall that e E and B ǫ are F-adapted, so they do not jump at τ, i.e., e E τ = e E τ− and B ǫ τ = B ǫ τ− , a.s. Then, by (.) together with (iv) in Lemma ., under clean close-out, a.s,
On the other hand, under replacement close-out,
We can remove D N in (.) by using (iii) in Lemma .. To this end, we introduce an incremental XVA process. In both close-out conventions, we will deal with the XVA process instead of (.). The XVA process is defined by the discounted difference between V − B ǫ and p N . Let X denote the (incremental) XVA process, i.e.,
Note that s ℓ (resp. s b ) represents the lending (resp. borrowing) spread of the hedger. We can easily check that for t ≥ 0, dp N t∧τ = 1 t≤τ dp N t . Assuming there exists (V , π) satisfying (.), by applying Itô's formula to X, we attain that for t ≤τ, (X,π) follows
Note that under replacement close-out,
while under clean close-out,Θ is independent of X. In both cases, we denote
In the case of clean close-out,Θ i , i ∈ {H, C}, represent the amount of breach of the contract. Recall B and p N are independent of V . Therefore, showing the existence and uniqueness of the hedger's hedging portfolio and hedging strategy, (V , π), reduces to investigating the BSDE of the XVA process (.). Before examining the solvability, assuming the existence and integrability, we define each component in the incremental XVA and give some remarks on them. 
where (.)-(.) are well-defined. In this case, we also define
Remark .. (i) Assume that the local-martingales in (.) are true martingales. Then
(ii) O is the opportunity cost of not entering the new contract. In addition, FCA and FBA is the aggregated funding cost and benefit together with the legacy portfolio. Recalling the definitions
the incremental funding impacts are the differences between aggregated funding adjustments and the opportunity cost.
(iii) Under replacement close-out,
while under clean close-out,
It is often stated that there is no FVA when contracts are fully collateralized. Indeed, European Banking Authority (EBA) requires banks to assess FCA and FBA for derivatives that "are not strongly collateralized" (see Cameron, ). To examine this, assume full collateralization, i.e., L m = 0, replacement close-out, and ρ = I. The condition of full repo markets is commonly chosen in literature. Moreover, when R ℓ ≥ r and R b ≥ r, we can see that FCA ∆ = FBA ∆ = 0 from (.) and (.). Therefore, based on our model, FVA ∆ is not necessary when the closeout amount is the replacement cost and all repo markets are fully liquid. However, even in full collateralization, FVA ∆ still exists under clean close-out. This is one of the reasons why replacement close-out should be discussed. 
The hedger may want to hedge the jump risk at τ H usingπ H so that ∆X τ H = 0, i.e., the hedger may chooseπ
Indeed, it will be shown later that (.) is the right choice. For now, we accept (.).
Assuming the local martingales in (.) are true martingales, by Definition ., for t <τ,
Then by Lemma .,
If we assume that the hedger's borrowing rate is higher than r only because of the own default risk, i.e., there is no liquidity premium, then we can approximate the hedger's borrowing spread as
With this assumption, FCA becomes a counterpart of DVA, i.e.,
The above two equations show the financial relationship between DVA and FCA. DVA is a benefit to the shareholders because the hedger may default on derivative payables. On the other hand, the bondholders will receive a partial amount of the derivative receivables, namely (1 − L H )(p N ) − . Therefore, the hedger should compensate the funding provider for the expected loss. When the hedger has redundant money, she can use it to buy back loans that were already issued. In this case, we may inspect s ℓ = h H L H . This inspection leads to DVA = FBA.
(.)
It is important to avoid double-counting for both pricing and accounting. However, in this case, recalling that (.), it seems that we have two adjustments with the approximately same value. If (.) is valid for many contracts, i.e., DVA is overlapped with FBA, then one of them should be ignored. Indeed, it often believed that recording both FBA and DVA in bank's account engenders a doublecounting paradox. On the other hand, IFRS and GAAP accept DVA. To remedy this, in FCA/FBA accounting, which is endorsed by some banks, DVA is recorded in Contra-Liability (CL) account and
is recorded in Contra-Asset (CA) account (see Albanese & Andersen, ; Castagna, ) . However, it has been pointed out that FCA/FBA accounting produces large asset/liability asymmetry.
The large asymmetry is partly attributed to the binary nature of FVA. Based on the marginal effect of entering a contract, the FCA term in CA account does not countervail the FBA term in CL account. It will be shown later that the binary nature of FVA is related to whether the payoff functions are increasing or decreasing with respect to underlying assets. On the other hand, because DVA occurs from derivative payables, e.g., p N ≥ 0 in (.), DVA arises where the payoffs are positive. Therefore, FBA and DVA are affected by different mathematical structures of derivative contracts, i.e., FBA is not overlapped with DVA in CA account. Thus, FCA/FBA accounting inevitably leads to large asset/liability asymmetry. To avoid the asymmetry, in FVA/FDA accounting, FVA is recorded in CA account and funding debt value adjustment (FDA) is recorded in CL account. FDA is a benefit that the bank can default on its liability. It was named DVA in Hull & White () . If liquidity is not considered, the value of FVA can be approximated by FDA. For the detail, readers may want to refer to Albanese & Andersen () .
In the next section, we represent (.) as a standard form, and reduce it to a BSDE on the reference filtration F.
. BSDE formulation
For a BSDE representation, we begin this section with considering a family of maps (φ t ) t≥0 such that
The form of (φ t ) t≥0 varies depending on parameters and accessibility of repo markets. Before giving the general form (φ t ) t≥0 , we examine some examples.
Example .. (i) Consider ρ = I, which is commonly assumed in literature. In this case,
(ii) Consider n = 1, and constant parameters. Then S 1 , S H , S C follow
It follows that i∈Iπ 1 σ i =π 1 σ 1 . When ρ = {H, C},
On the other hand, when ρ = {1, C}, i∈I\ρπ i =π H . Thus,
This case was discussed by Burgard & Kjaer () .

(iii) On the other hand, let us assume that OIS rate is an F-adapted process. In addition, we assume that for any i ∈ {H, C}, (G i t ) t≥0 is given by
where (h i t ) t≥0 are deterministic processes. We consider non-defaultable and defaultable zero coupon bonds with the same maturity as T , i.e., S 1 , S H , S C are defined as
It follows that for t < τ,
and assume that Σ is invertible for any t < T . Then,
On the other hand, consider ρ ∅ and define 1 ρ ∈ R n by
Therefore, the form of BSDE depends on the choice of model, accessibility of repo markets, etc. However, from (.)-(.), we can observe that φ is linear in z, Z N ,π H ,π C . As we will see later that π H andπ C can be dependent of a solution of the BSDE under replacement close-out. For simplicity, we assume that φ is an independent form ofπ H andπ C such as (.), (.), and (.).

Assumption .. For some n-dimensional F-progressively measurable process α,
Remark .. Note that we do not exclude the convention commonly used in the literature that assets are traded from repo markets, i.e., I = ρ. In this case, we can set α = 0 in Assumption .. Now, we denote the generator of (.) by g G , i.e.,
In addition, we denote the incremental exposures by Θ ∆,i , i ∈ {H, C}, more precisely,
denote the solution, in a certain space, of the following BSDE:
provides (X,π) as well as (V , π).
However, instead of directly dealing with (.), we will investigate a reduced BSDE on the reference filtration F. The idea is as follows. It is a known fact that in the progressively enlarged filtration G, for any G-optional (resp. predictable) process has an F-optional (resp. predictable) reduction. Therefore, if there exists a solution of (.) such that Y G is G-optional and Z G is G-predictable, there exists an F-adapted pair (Y F , Z F ) satisfying
Moreover, we guess that (Y F , Z F ) is a solution of a BSDE on the reference filtration F, i.e., "for some"
together with (.), we can expect that
(.)
By applying Itô's formula to (.), we can find what the proper g F should be. At the end, finding (V , π) reduces to investigating the reduced BSDE (.). The next proposition explains the detail.
 Proposition .. Assume there exits a unique solution
T of the following BSDE:
solve (.) by the following relationships:
Y G t =1 t<τ Y F t + 1 t≥τ − 1τ =τ=τ HΘ ∆,H τ (Y F τ− ) + 1τ =τ=τ CΘ ∆,C τ (Y F τ− ) , (.) Z G t =1 t<τ Z F t , (.) π H t =Y F t +Θ H t (Y F t− ), (.) π C t =Y F t −Θ C t (Y F t− ). (.)
Moreover, if (H)-hypothesis holds between F and G, i.e., any (F, Q)-martingale is a (G, Q)-martingale, then (.)-(.) is the only solution of (.).
Proof. By Itô's formula, Remark .. (.) explains how the bank's own default can be beneficial to the shareholders. The own default can be monetized by buying back their own bond that becomes cheaper. However, this means that banks can realize the profit only when they actually default. Indeed, DVA is often excluded from Common Equity Tier  capital (CET), which is a proxy of the shareholder's wealth.
Note that hY F in g F is an adjustment for an early termination. To see this, letŶ
Moreover, by Definition . and Lemma ., if Z F ∈ H 2,n T , for t < τ,
and XVA = G −1Ŷ . Still, because of the semi-linearity in (.) and (.), we need to solve (.) numerically. More importantly, it will be interesting to investigate how much cancellation between FCA and FBA, and between FBA and DVA, can be expected. We answer the questions in the next section. Based on our model, the answers for the questions are both negative.
 Main Results
In this section, we show a binary nature of FVA; FVA is either FCA or -FBA. In other words, either FCA = 0 or FBA = 0. This switching property of FVA is determined by some properties of payoff structures of the derivative contract. Before the main theorem, we explain the idea by an example first.
Example . (Stock forward contract with clean close-out).
Consider n = 1, e N = p N . For simplicity, we assume all parameters are constant and let the traded assets (S 1 , S H , S C ) given by
 Moreover, we assume that the defaultable bonds can be traded through repo markets, i.e., ρ = {H, C}. Then i∈Iπ i σ i =π 1 σ 1 and i∈I\ρπ i =π 1 , therefore
Thus, the generator g F becomes
To explain the idea, the hedger should pay
T K at an early termination t < T . For the payment, she needs to retain S 1 . To buy S 1 , the hedger may need to borrow money, so it is expected that s ℓ does not play an important role in maintaining the hedging portfolio. Therefore, we guess
Unless the tendency of (.) is dominated by the legacy portfolio, we can recover a linear BSDE. For simplicity, we assume that the dealer had big enough exposure to the counterparty before the new contract and the initial exposure dominates the new exposure, i.e., we assume that
Then we consider (Y # , Z # ) satisfying
Then we will show that
To show this, we take another transformation,
Under mild conditions, we can obtain ( 0≤t≤T . In addition, note that (.) is equivalent to
t . Namely, (.) can be written as
We will show V F · ≤ V 
We will show that the above inequalities hold if ǫ is not too big. More precisely, we assume
It is easy to check
Moreover, by Proposition . in Di Nunno et al. () ,

Moreover, Z N = Dp N = (σ 1 ) −1S 1 . Then, it follows that 
and obtain opposite inequalities of (.) and (.). In this case, FCA = 0. Thus, the binary funding impacts depend on the value of initial portfolio, ǫ.
(ii) If inequalities such as (.) are not satisfied, instead of (.) in the above example, one should consider
If the hedger and counterparty are both major banks having similar credit risks so that we can assume h H L H = h C L C , we can obtain the same result as in Example ..
(iii) Note that in the above example, DVA 0. Consider the same market conditions but
Namely, the hedger is in long position of the stock forward contract. We can calculate the same way for the opposite inequality of (.). In this case, FCA = 0, and still DVA 0. Note that FVA is either −FBA or FCA, so neutralization of a substantial portion between FCA and FBA is hardly expected. This binary nature of FVA is a source of asset/liability asymmetry of FCA/FBA accounting.
(iv) Example . also tells us how and when FBA and DVA are different. FBA, as a counterpart of FCA, reduces FCA which originates from the bank's default risk. DVA is also a benefit from the bank's default risk, but it is hard to monetize DVA before the bank actually defaults. By these reasons, it is often believed that FBA and DVA are overlapped, and DVA is not considered in derivative transactions. However, Example . shows the different mathematical structure between FBA and DVA. DVA is a benefit from the possibility that the bank may default on its derivative payables. Thus, DVA occurs where ξ ≥ 0. On the other hand, FBA occurs where the opposite inequality of (.). To understand the meaning of (.), we set ǫ = 0 and consider ξ = ψ(S 1 T ) for some smooth function ψ : R → R + . Then, FBA occurs where
where α = (σ 1 ) −1 in Example .. (.) can be rewritten as
and (.) again can be rewritten as
One sufficient condition for (.) is that ψ is non-increasing. Similarly, consider ξ = Ψ(S 1 T ), where Ψ(x) ≔ a(x − k), for some a ∈ R and k > 0. In this case again, (.) is equivalent to a ≤ 0. In summary, DVA occurs where the payoff is positive while FBA occurs where the payoff is non-increasing.
(v) Another reason of belief that FBA is overlapped with DVA may be the convention in literature that all assets can be traded in repo markets, i.e., ρ = I. Recall that α = 0 when ρ = I (recall Remark .). When α = 0, by (.), FBA also occurs where ξ ≥ 0. However, we can not guarantee that repo markets are always available. Indeed, there are some difficulties in using equities as repo collateral. The amounts of traded equities are smaller than fixed-income securities and there is no generally accepted method to valuate equities. By these reasons, equity repo markets are often limited to equity indices and baskets including many securities.
Remark .. To the best of our knowledge, Malliavin differentiability of ABSDE has not been studied. In cases of clean close-out, the absence of initial margin is merely for simplicity. However, when we consider with initial margin under replacement close-out, we can not use the same method as in Example ..
. Main Theorems
In what follows, for the incremental effects, we focus on funding impacts, so in what follows, we assume that
i.e., CVA ∆ = CVA and DVA ∆ = DVA. However, ǫ may not be zero. Under this restriction, we give the main theorems to show that either FBA= 0 or FCA= 0. We consider deterministic default intensities, volatility, and funding spreads, but (r t ) t≥0 does not need to be deterministic so that we can apply the result to cases that (r t ) t≥0 is a general F-adapted process. These assumptions are mainly for simplicity. One case of stochastic default intensities is reported in Appendix. Moreover, we consider a derivatives of European style. For derivatives that has cash-flows at multiple times, we can divide the interval [0, T ] according to the time of cash-flows. For example, if
, we consider the following BSDE:
Then we can apply the next theorems for each BSDE (.). The idea of the proofs is similar to Example ., and the proofs are reported in Appendix. We start from clean close-out. 
We assume that
(ii) On the other hand, assume that for any θ ≤ T ,
) and (.) are not required in (i) and (ii).
Recall that when we consider replacement close-out,Θ ∆,i , i ∈ {H, C}, depend on Y F . However, Θ ∆,i (y) is not differentiable in y. We can avoid the irregularity by considering contracts such that eitherp N ≥ 0 orp N ≤ 0, dQ ⊗ dt a.s, i.e., options. 
We assume that either ξ ≥ 0 or ξ ≤ 0 a.s, i.e., we consider options.
(i) Assume that ǫ ≤ 0 and for any θ ≤ T ,
T that satisfies
and (Y # , Z # ) = (Y F , Z F ). In particular, for both cases, FBA = 0.

(ii) Assume that ǫ ≥ 0 and for any θ ≤ T ,
and
In particular, for both cases, FCA = 0.
 Examples and a Closed-form Solution
Many standard derivatives satisfy the conditions in Theorem . and Theorem .. We will apply the main theorems to several derivatives and provide a closed-form solution for a call option. In what follows, for i ∈ I, we denoteS
Moreover, recall that in the main theorems, we defined ξ by
. Clean close-out
Banks buy Treasury bonds that return less than their funding rate. It was insisted in Hull & White () that this shows that FVA should not be considered in derivative prices. We will show that when buying bonds, FCA= 0 for the hedger. Therefore, if we assume
as in Burgard & Kjaer () , the fair price for the hedger is approximately the same as the bond price derived from discounting with the Treasury rate. Recall that, in the main theorem, we only assume that s ℓ and s b are deterministic. As long as the spreads are deterministic, we can apply the theorems to interest rate derivatives. 
for some κ, θ, Σ > 0. Thus,
Moreover, we assume ρ = ∅. Then i∈Iπ i σ i = σ 1 ( i∈Iπ i ). Therefore,
Since
by Corollary . in Di Nunno et al. (), for any θ ≤ t, D θ r t = Σe −κ(t−θ) , and it follows that
Recalling that ξ = −B −1
It follows that for any θ ≤ t,p
Therefore, by (ii) in Theorem ., FCA= 0 where ǫ ≥ 0. Therefore, if the initial value of legacy portfolio is non-negative, the trader does not enter a borrowing position and there is no FVA that should be recouped. Ú
The next example is a general form of Example ..

Example . (Combination of forward contracts). Let n = 1, ρ = {H, C}, and the traded assets are given by
Since ρ = {H, C}, i∈Iπ i σ i = σ 1π1 and i∈I\ρπ i =π 1 . Thus,
We consider a combination of forward contracts:
We assume that parameters are deterministic and
By the definition of clean price,p
Since dS 
Recall that as defined in Theorem .,
Note that 1pN =0 = 0, dQ ⊗ dt a.s. Then by the (.) and (.), we attain that
Assume that
and FCA= 0. Ú To find an analytic form of (.), let V F ≔ Y F +p N , Π F = Z F +Z N , and let Q ℓ denote an equivalent measure such that (B ℓ ) −1 S i is (Q ℓ , G)-local martingales. In particular,
 where E ℓ is the expectation under Q ℓ . (.) reduces the computational cost because it changes from backward simulation to forward simulation. In other words, we can reduce the computational cost for calculating conditional expectations at each time step in solving BSDEs numerically. However, the advantage stops there with clean close-out convention and we can not find a closed-form solution of V F . This is because of the mismatch of the pricing measures in
To avoid this difficulty, Brigo et al. () considered un-collateralized contracts with null cash-flow at defaults. On the other hand, Bichuch et al. () assumed that the close-out amount and collateral are calculated by the risk-neutral price under Q ℓ (or Q b ), namely
In these cases, the pricing measures are aligned and a closed-form solution is allowed. However, note that (.) is clean price + "the hedger's FVA".
As we will see later, when replacement close-out is assumed, the inconsistency of pricing measures does not appear and closed-form solutions are given. However, recall that the hedger's funding information is already considered in V − . Thus, the consistency of pricing measures is inherent in replacement close-out.
. Replacement Close-out
In the next example, we deal with a non-Markovian case. This is one benefit of BSDEs and Malliavin calculus.
Example . (Floating strike Asian call option with replacement close-out). We consider the same market condition as in Example . except
Moreover, we consider a floating strike Asian call option:
Therefore, FBA= 0, where ǫ ≤ 0.
As the last example, we deal with a bond option.
Example . (Bond option with replacement close-out). We assume that the same market conditions as in Example
where K > 0 and S 1 ·,U is a zero coupon bond with U > T as its maturity. We consider two defaultable bonds with the same maturity, i.e.,
Recall φ(z) = α(z + Z N ) = (σ 1 ) −1 (z + Z N ), and
Moreover, recall the definition of ξ:

In addition,
It follows that on {S Under replacement close-out, we can find a closed-form solution. As an example, we discuss the solution of a stock call option. Let n = 1,
for some constants r and σ 1 . We also assume that s b , h H are constant. Recall

It is easy to check that
Therefore, by (i) in Theorem ., FBA= 0 and (Y F , Z F ) follows
is an (F, Q b )-Brownian motion and E b denote the expectation under Q b . Then (.) becomes
Thus, it follows that
Note that there is no inconsistency of pricing measures. This is because we considered the hedger's funding cost and benefit in the close-out amount, e N = V − . To represent (.) in an explicit form, write
Then (.) becomes, for t <τ,
More explicitly,
is a weighted sum of s b and −h H L H . It shows how the effect of DVA is transferred to FCA as L m changes. As L m increases, the effect of funding cost is weaken, since the cost of posting the collateral is more expensive than the interest rate remunerating on the collateral, namely OIS rate. In more detail,
is a deduction from DVA, while
is a compensation for the hedger for posting the collateral. However, this is not the only FCA. The other part of FCA is the cost to acquire S 1 and it is included in C b .
 Conclusion
In summary, we discussed a binary nature of FVA. By the binary nature of FVA, we can recover linear BSDEs and analytic solutions are allowed. In cases of replacement close-out, the analytic solution can be represented as a closed-form. As a byproduct, this feature of FVA explains how FBA and DVA are different. In addition, this result provides an interpretation why banks buy Treasury bonds with presence of funding rates higher than OIS rate.
We will show that To this end, we introduce another transformation: Note that (A.) is equivalent to 
Hence, by uniqueness of (Y F , Z F ), we obtain (Y F , Z F ) = (Y # , Z # ). Moreover, by (.), FBA = 0. The proof of (ii) is similar to (i). Ú
B Stochastic Intensities
We assume that h i , i ∈ {H, C}, are F-adapted processes, but σ H and σ C are deterministic. For simplicity, we set ǫ = 0 and e E = 0. Let n = 2, B −1 t D N t = 1 T ≤t ξ for some ξ ≥ 0, and we consider replacement close-out. ξ is determined by an asset S 1 , but the market is completed by another non-defaultable traded asset S 2 . We assume
is of full rank. In this case, we can not expect that the transformation 
